Business and the State in International Relations

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Bureaus have an inherent tendency to expand, regardless of whether or not there is any genuine need for more of their services. In fact, all organizations have inherent tendencies to expand.

—Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy

The defense establishment now devotes a large share of its efforts to self perpetuation. ... War justifies the existence of the establishment. ... Standing closely behind these [military] leaders, encouraging and prompting them, are the rich and powerful defense industries. Standing in front, adorned with service caps, ribbons, and lapel emblems, is a nation of veterans—patriotic, belligerent, romantic, and well intentioned, finding a certain sublimation and excitement in their country's latest military venture.

—General David M. Shoup, Former commandant, United States Marine Corps, "The New American Militarism"

The military-industrial complex is a very healthy thing.

—Elbridge Durbrow, Vice Chairman, American Security Council

The question of the military-industrial complex provides an interesting case in the sociology of knowledge. During the 1960s and 1970s, scholars directed considerable attention toward the phenomenon of military-industrial linkages, and numerous titles contained the phrase "military-industrial complex." The attention to this approach was, at least to some extent, correlated with a loss of prestige by the military and, indeed, the entire executive branch
of government, due to the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, the Church Committee hearings on the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), and other memorable events of that period. Much of the writing on the military-industrial complex was polemical and journalistic, but there were also serious empirical studies, which tested the approach under controlled conditions. Some well-known and respected political scientists and economists, including Murray Weidenbaum, Samuel Huntington, Robert Art, Bruce Russett, and James Kurth, published research on the subject.¹ In 1973, Steven Rosen concluded that, despite some contrary findings, "it is remarkable how well it [the military-industrial complex approach] has withstood critical evaluation, some of it from an obviously skeptical perspective. ... We conclude that the theory of the military-industrial complex is a most useful analytical construct for both research and policy evaluation purposes."²

The phrase "military-industrial complex" (MIC) was first used, of course, in Eisenhower's 1961 Farewell Address, but its basic formulation is usually attributed to C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite*, which examines the social and political significance of military institutions and weapons procurement companies and treats these groups, collectively, as a vested interest.³ The concept of the military-industrial complex has been applied to a wide range of empirical questions. Most research on the MIC emphasizes U.S. policy during the cold war era, although some studies analyze the MIC during earlier periods of U.S. history.⁴ In addition, the approach has been applied, with some modifications, to military policy in the (former) USSR.⁵

However, research on the military-industrial complex has fallen out of fashion in recent years. Since 1980, there has been almost no scholarly attention to military-industrial linkages, their implications for the functioning of the military, or their overall significance for foreign policy.⁶ Instead, the mainstream of the international relations literature has focused overwhelmingly on realist approaches, which emphasize international factors over domestic politics as the driving force behind war. Government officials in the military and throughout the foreign policy apparatus are seen as "autonomous" from interest group pressures, according to the realist approach; foreign policy decisions are made to suit the "national interest," not the interests of the military-industrial complex or of any other pressure group.⁷ It is ironic that studies of the military-industrial complex disappeared precisely at the time of one of the largest military buildups in U.S. history, when the military reached exceptional levels of influence and prestige during Reagan's presidency. Despite its fall from fashion, the MIC approach retains considerable value. The approach has been endorsed by several high-ranking officials, and some of these, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, were certainly well placed to evaluate its validity.

This chapter reevaluates the military-industrial complex perspective. Specifically, it is argued that the military and its associated private sector con-
tractors constitute a political lobby, one that favors international tension and, in some cases, war. I argue also, contrary to realist approaches, that considerations of military-industrial interests significantly influence the substance of policy, with regard to "low politics" issue areas, such as defense procurement, as well as to "high politics" areas, such as the initiation and conduct of military action. I test these propositions in a case study of U.S. responses to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the late 1970s. In my view, the military-industrial complex remains a useful analytical tool.

Toward a Military-Industrial Complex Approach

To develop a detailed military-industrial complex model of U.S. foreign policy, we must first look at the "military" side of the construct. The MIC approach essentially views the military as an interest group (or a cluster of interest groups). Accordingly, conflicts of interest will inevitably emerge between the military's commitment to furthering national security, on the one hand, and its interest in advancing the concerns of itself and its individual members, on the other hand. The MIC approach focuses primarily on the uniformed military, but it also takes into account the interests of civilian employees in the Department of Defense, who have an interest in augmented military expenditures, as well as officers from the CIA, who hold similar interests. In addition, civilians working for research institutes with military connections, such as the Rand Corporation, can be considered a part of the military-industrial complex. In short, a wide range of personnel comprise the military-industrial complex, and this complex, because of its sheer size, constitutes a potent pressure group.

Officers view the world through the lens of their own services, and their views will not always correspond to what an objective observer might conclude. The literature on bureaucracy has firmly established that all institutions are motivated, to some extent, by considerations of self-interest, and the older notion of a self-sacrificing bureaucrat has long since been modified, if not outright discarded. Anthony Downs, for example, wrote that "bureaucratic officials, like all other agents in society, are significantly—though not solely—motivated by their own self interests."8 One of the most important interests, common to nearly all bureaucrats, is the desire to expand their agencies or, at least, to preserve them from contraction. The military will surely seek to increase military expenditures and to protect itself against potential budget cuts. Military officers lobby for augmented budget allocations, for ever-greater amounts of federal land devoted to military exercises, and for continually more up-to-date weapons systems. Most variants of the MIC model emphasize these expansionist tendencies.9 And, in general, it is emphasized that the military will seek such expansion even when it contributes little or nothing to national security in any objective
sense; bureaucratic expansion has its own logic. Some approaches, such as that of Alan Wolfe, also emphasize the importance of rivalries among the four services in the military and how these rivalries will intensify the demands for increased military expenditures. ¹⁰

Despite all of these considerations, it would be mistaken to assume that military personnel always act in a consciously cynical way. It has been generally accepted among sociologists, ever since the publication of Karl Mannheim's pioneering work on ideology, that individuals and groups tend to see their own interests as universal interests. Vernon Aspaturian analyzes the matter this way: "Perception itself is frequently a reflection of self-interest rather than objective reality," and there inevitably is some "unconscious distortion of the objective situation through the prism of individual or group self-interest." ¹¹ Or as a U.S. admiral once put it, very subtly: "Any step that is not good for the Navy, is not good for the nation." ¹² Thus military officers (reinforced, in many cases, by retired officers and veterans' organizations) will constitute a powerful lobby in favor of a promilitary policy. This power will be bolstered by lobbying from the weapons industry.

The "industrial" side of the military-industrial complex has accounted for a substantial proportion of the U.S. economy; between 5 and 10 percent for most of the post-World War II period, and, in 1977, it accounted for almost half of gross fixed capital investment. ¹³ It occupies a particularly important niche among science-based and advanced technology industries such as microelectronics. In 1982, some 30 percent of U.S. scientists and engineers worked for the federal government, and the government funded about half of all research and development in the United States; according to one study, "the overwhelming bulk of this [federal research] effort is related to defense." ¹⁴ It is also worth noting that the military industries tend to be concentrated in specific states, and some of these states—such as California—are of special political importance. ¹⁵ In addition, the military procurement corporations, or the "defense" industry as it is usually termed, comprise some of the largest companies in the United States, including such giants as Boeing, Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics, and United Technologies.

The economic importance of the military-industrial complex has been widely debated. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy argue that defense spending constitutes a kind of "military keynesianism," and that these expenditures stimulate the whole macroeconomy. ¹⁶ Other analysts, such as Seymour Melman, suggest that military expenditures are really a drag on the economy, which reduce living standards for large parts of the population. Finally, Betty Hanson and Bruce Russett argue that major segments of the business community clearly do not benefit from excessively high military expenditures. ¹⁷ Conversely, Ann Markuson et al. present evidence that the defense budget does contribute to the prosperity of at least some regions of the United States (despite deleterious effects on other regions). ¹⁸
The relationship between military spending and the macroeconomy is clearly a complex one, and it would go beyond the limits of this chapter to explore these effects in detail. For purposes of this discussion, I will eschew macroeconomic analysis and, instead, focus on how the MIC affects individual companies. It will be argued that, whatever its effects on the economy overall, specific companies clearly do benefit from high military expenditures. Also, manufacturers of basic weaponry components, especially electronics, will have similar interests. Mining companies, too, will benefit at least indirectly, since defense spending usually augments demand for basic metals. In addition, certain types of foreign investors, particularly those with large capital investments in unstable regions (oil companies in the Persian Gulf, for example) may also favor increased military expenditures. These companies, collectively, will constitute a pro-military bloc within the business community. We would expect such companies to mobilize in support of the uniformed services, all in favor of augmented military spending.

Thus the military-industrial complex represents those segments of the government and the private sector that have vested interests in increasing military expenditures. Both elements—the military and industrial components—can coordinate their activities to some extent, due to the career patterns of military personnel. In the well-known revolving-door pattern, officers often retire and then work as executives for the weapons procurement companies. The practice is widespread and well established. A 1969 congressional study found that some 2,000 former officers, many of flag rank, were employed with the largest defense contractors. The interlinking of powerful bureaucratic and private interests may be viewed as a device to overcome or reduce collective action problems in the MIC. Revolving-door practices, in addition to social connections among former officers built up over years of academy training and career advancement, promote collective self-identification among disparate elements of the MIC and, accordingly, a capacity for collective action. This capacity greatly increases the MIC’s political efficacy.

Despite these resources, the military-industrial complex is far from omnipotent. Other elements of the bureaucracy, such as the agriculture or labor departments, compete for funds, and these agencies, too, are linked to powerful constituent groups. It is also important to emphasize that the business community is not monolithic and that some businesses clearly do not have interests in military spending. Defense policy will also be influenced by conflicts within the business community. Companies that depend on government contracts in nonmilitary sectors—construction companies that specialize in urban infrastructure, for example—may oppose “excessive” military allocations, since this would reduce spending in other areas. Moreover, com-
mercial banks sometimes oppose military spending on the grounds that such spending can be inflationary, and inflation undermines the international strength of the dollar. In addition, some elements of U.S. society—members of peace groups, for example—remain hostile toward the military on ideological grounds. Some of these various "antimilitary" elements can work together to oppose increased military expenditures.

Defense spending will thus provoke conflicts between pro-military and antimilitary business factions. Overall, we would expect the MIC to have distinct advantages over opponents, at least in the early stages of a controversy. Defense contractors have a direct interest in supporting high levels of defense spending, while antimilitary business interests have essentially indirect interests in opposing such spending. We would expect antimilitary interests to mobilize only in reaction to excessive, potentially inflationary military budgets, and the reactive nature of the antimilitary interests reduces their political effectiveness. Peace groups face other constraints: They must rely on very large memberships for their strength, and such mass movements face serious collective action problems. The core elements in the military-industrial complex—top officers and major executives in defense industries—are a smaller, more cohesive group, and, as Mancur Olson has demonstrated, small groups have systematic advantages in overcoming collective action problems.

Inevitably, the existence of the MIC creates a bureaucratic pressure for conflict and even war. It is well known that an officer must gain combat experience in order to achieve promotion, especially to the higher ranks. The pressures for "action" also exist for employees of the CIA, officers of which must organize covert operations in order to advance their careers. Warfare serves yet another function: It justifies the continued existence of the military, and, if the war is relatively easy and painless, it increases the prestige of the services.

Obviously such uses of force carry risks, and generals will avoid reckless operations; such caution has undoubtedly increased since the debacle of Vietnam. Thus, military commanders are unlikely to favor operations that entail high risk of casualties or ones that lack clearly defined objectives (proposed U.S. intervention in ex-Yugoslavia would fall into this category). Rational self-interest would surely militate against rash adventurism by the military. Nevertheless, the MIC remains enthusiastic over operations that have well-defined objectives and low risks (such as the invasions of Grenada and Panama). General David Shoup, former commandant of the Marine Corps, notes that "civilians can scarcely understand or even believe that many ambitious military professionals truly yearn for wars as opportunities for glory and distinction that are afforded only in combat." The military services, like all bureaucratic entities, seek to demonstrate their capabilities from time to time and to favor policies that enable them to do so.
It is worth mentioning that various “radical” interpretations of U.S. foreign policy emphasize that wars, especially Third World interventions, serve to protect or spread U.S. investments.29 There is some validity to this view, and, as we have seen, the MIC approach acknowledges that foreign investors can be expected to support a strong military. Nevertheless, the MIC approach eschews the role of foreign investors in influencing policy and considers them to be of secondary importance. In essence, the military-industrial complex approach sees wars as ends in themselves, in the sense that wars advance the political objectives of the MIC and help justify its existence. A war may or may not help U.S. foreign investors, but it augments the fortunes and budget allocations of the military and its associated industries. These objectives will sometimes constitute important factors in motivating war. Concomitantly, members of the MIC will have a vested interest in seeing international events as “crises” and as potential “threats to national security”; such perceptions flow directly from the interests of the MIC. The military, after all, is able to attract greater resources when the public perceives a threat to national security. The military-industrial complex is, then, a permanent bureaucratic pressure in favor of at least some degree of international tension.

The MIC approach to U.S. foreign policy differs markedly from realist approaches. Hans Morgenthau nicely sums up the realist view: “Men do not fight because they have arms ... they have arms because they deem it necessary to fight.”30 The MIC approach would argue, in contrast to Morgenthau, that the existence of a large military will constitute an independent factor, one that will influence decisionmaking processes—including processes leading to warfare.

In the real world, of course, many factors influence defense policy, in addition to pressures from the MIC, and these factors include genuine security interests and assorted ideological objectives. For now, however, I will put aside these other considerations and continue to work with the ideal type of military-industrial complex.31 Seen as an ideal type, the approach emphasizes the internal determinants of foreign policy. If this approach is correct, then U.S. foreign and military policy is significantly influenced by military-industrial lobbying, and the resulting actions often have little to do with the national interest.

Application

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is an excellent case study in the context of this discussion for the simple reason that it was a decisively important event in the history of the cold war. It is generally agreed that it was Afghanistan, more than any other single factor, that ended the policies of détente between the United States and the USSR.32 Both the Republican and Demo-
crat Parties adopted strongly promilitary positions during the 1980 campaign, and a large-scale military expansion commenced during the decade that followed that election. In short, Afghanistan was the major factor that terminated détente and triggered policies of increased confrontation. Few would quibble with the following commentary by Raymond Garthoff: “The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan ... and the American reaction to it marked a watershed in American-Soviet relations.”

The questions raised are basic: Why did the United States respond so strongly to the Soviet invasion? And why was it considered such a dire threat to Western security? In what follows, I illustrate the use of the MIC approach, and, in accord with the methodology of ideal types, the discussion will be deliberately one-sided. Basically, the military-industrial complex approach argues that the dramatic U.S. response to the invasion resulted, not from security considerations, but from military lobbying. Specifically, I show that elements of the military-industrial complex had been pressuring the public and the Carter administration for higher levels of defense spending and for more aggressive foreign policies to support this spending; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presented an ideal opportunity to generate public support for these policies.

First, let us explore some of the background to the case. By the 1970s, the military had lost considerable prestige, and its influence was at a historic low. This loss of prestige was indicated by the antiwar movement, by antimilitary films such as Catch-22 and MASH, and by the relatively pacific détente policies of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. The military’s decline was also marked by the number of academic studies with “military-industrial complex” in the title. More important, the military was gradually losing its share of the budget, and the prodigious growth that the military had enjoyed during the early years of the cold war had, for the most part, ended. Measured in real terms, U.S. military expenditures declined absolutely during the period 1971-1977, and it stagnated until the end of the decade. As a percentage of GNP (gross national product), the decline is even more apparent: Military spending constituted 8.2 percent of GNP in 1964, rising to 9.3 percent during the height of the Vietnam War in 1968. Thereafter, the proportion began to slide, falling to 4.9 percent of GNP in 1980.

The military-industrial complex was also losing ground in the competition for overseas arms sales. During the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. government was reluctant to support large-scale militarization in Third World countries, and, as a result, U.S. arms exporters lost markets to aggressive European competitors. France became a major weapons producer during this period, and French equipment, especially the Mirage series of fighter planes, offered stiff competition. Latin American countries began to turn to Europe (particularly to France) for advanced weapons, and, by 1973, the United States accounted for only 20 percent of Latin American arms sales.
U.S. arms exporters became increasingly anxious about this new competition. Various other segments of the business community were coming under increased pressure at this time, as well. Specifically, multinational corporations faced ever-increasing economic nationalism in the Third World, with demands for profit sharing, purchases of domestically-produced inputs, and diffusion of technology. Many Third World countries nationalized foreign holdings or circumscribed their autonomy. Finally, political instability threatened foreign investments in many Third World countries, including Iran, Nigeria, South Africa, and even South Korea. Many multinational corporations hired political advisers to help them manage these developments, and the new field of “political risk analysis” became a staple of the business press. However, political consultants were often of questionable value and, in any case, they were inadequate substitutes for the (now diminished) threat of U.S. military intervention. By the end of the 1970s, many multinationals became concerned that the U.S. government was not doing enough to protect their investments. In 1979, Business Week ran a special issue that lamented “the decline of U.S. power.” Multinational investors thus became one more element in a broad coalition that had a vested interest in augmented military expenditures and an aggressive foreign policy.

The military-industrial complex model would expect these various, dissatisfied interests to mobilize in order to recover their previous level of influence. We would expect that the MIC would argue for increased military expenditures, and that, in order to justify such actions, they would cite alleged national security threats. Finally, we would expect certain foreign investors, especially those operating in unstable areas of the Third World, to align themselves politically with the MIC and to join in the pressure for a stronger military.

This is in fact what happened during the late 1970s. The military-industrial complex did indeed mobilize during this period. Promilitary lobbies included the American Security Council (ASC) and the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC). During the 1970s, these two groups considerably strengthened their financial support. The ASC increased its contributions from $910,000 in 1972 to $1,700,000 in 1977; the NSIC increased its contributions from $620,000 in 1971 to $1,100,000 in 1976. Even accounting for inflation, the increased level of financial contributions was impressive. These contributions may be viewed as an index of the discontent felt by the military and its supporters. In 1976, a wholly new organization was formed, the Committee on the Present Danger, which worked closely with the previously mentioned groups to change the course of foreign policy. By the end of the 1970s, a formidable military lobby was in place. This process of mobilization undoubtedly reflected many factors, in addition to self-interest on the part of the military and its affiliated industries. The political mobilization also reflected the neoconservative movement among in-
tellectuals; increasing anti-Sovietism among U.S. Jews; the rise of Protestant fundamentalism (which had strong conservative and anticommunist overtones); and the traditional cold war views of U.S. labor organizations.44

However, there is no doubt that the military-industrial complex was also an important factor. According to one account, the Committee on the Present Danger was launched “by a broad cross section of leading businessmen and onetime military figures and received a substantial start-up grant from David Packard, board chairman of Hewlett Packard.”45 One of the most prominent members of the Committee was Paul Nitze, who as author of the famous “National Security Council Memorandum No. 68,” was a major architect of the cold war. With regard to the ASC, for example, Jerry Sanders noted that its backers included some of the country’s largest defense contractors, including:

Honeywell Corporation, General Electric, Lockheed, and McDonnell-Douglas, as well as firms like Motorola. ... In addition, the leadership and policy committees of the Committee include many retired military men of high rank, among them Daniel Graham, and CPD [Committee on the Present Danger] members Lyman Lemnitzer, Andrew J. Goodpaster, and Maxwell Taylor, as well as several congressmen with a stake in military spending. In an interview for this book, Elbridge Durbrow, vice chairman of the American Security Council was asked if the military-industrial characterization bothered him. His reply was emphatic: “Hell no—if our military and industry can’t get together how are we going to defend our country?”46

Further, an analysis of military publications from this period shows that the military was indeed prepared to lobby for increased military expenditures and major changes in foreign policy.47 Overall, the promilitary groups spent considerable sums during the late 1970s, sponsoring various symposia, television shows, and other assorted publicity events. The various groups also lobbied against the revised Panama Canal treaty in 1978 and against the SALT II agreement with the USSR in 1979. The lobbying effort reached a particularly high level during the SALT II debate. The opponents of SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) included military-industrial groups as well as more ideologically oriented conservative organizations. Together, these groups collaborated to lobby the public and the Congress against the treaty. According to Jerry Sanders, “The American Security Council targeted 10 million persons for its direct mail operation,” while other anti-SALT pressure groups launched separate mailing drives. A petition against the treaty was organized in all fifty states, and a speakers’ bureau with 150 potential speakers was organized. The Committee on the Present Danger effectively used its prestigious membership as expert witnesses against the treaty during congressional hearings; this testimony gained wide publicity. Finally, lobby
groups produced anti-SALT films, and these were aired by several hundred local television stations throughout the country.\textsuperscript{48}

Examining the lobbying efforts of the period, one is struck by the considerable asymmetry of resources between the promilitary and antimilitary groups. In the case of SALT II, the promilitary groups outspent groups supporting the treaty by a considerable margin. In March 1979, the Christian Science Monitor estimated that promilitary groups outspent their opponents by fifteen to one.\textsuperscript{49} There was some business support for the SALT treaty, especially among large financial institutions and companies that traded with the USSR, but it played a relatively passive role. (Such interests did, however, become mobilized several years later, in response to the Reagan-era arms buildup.\textsuperscript{50}) The peace groups, too, were not very active during the period of study here, while the Carter administration was notably inept in mobilizing support for its foreign policy objectives.\textsuperscript{51} Overwhelmingly, it was the military-industrial complex that dominated lobbying efforts. Under the weight of this pressure, the U.S. public was gradually moved to accept highly critical views of the USSR, while the Carter administration, for its part, succumbed and adopted increasingly promilitary policies.\textsuperscript{52}

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the administration abandoned its relatively mild policies altogether and moved into a position of conflict. The most immediate change in policy was an open material support for the mujahidin guerrillas who were fighting the Soviets. And, more important, the invasion was used to justify a generalized shift in policy. The Carter Doctrine was declared, threatening the Soviets with war should they attack the Persian Gulf. The SALT treaty was largely abandoned, while virtually all commercial, scientific, or cultural contacts between the superpowers were curtailed or discarded completely. Carter promised an arms buildup with a particular emphasis on augmented “capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas.”\textsuperscript{53}

The incoming Reagan administration expanded these promilitary policies further, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was the administration’s main justification. During the period 1980–1985, military spending (adjusted for inflation) increased by 39 percent, and, during the same period, defense spending substantially increased its share of the federal budget, accounting for 27 percent of the total by 1985.\textsuperscript{54} There was also an increased willingness to use force, with direct military actions in Grenada, Libya, and Lebanon, as well as “covert” paramilitary operations throughout the world. U.S. arms exports were again encouraged.

There can be no doubt that the military-industrial complex benefited considerably from these new policies. In short, the MIC approach would interpret these events as follows: The U.S. government reacted so strongly to the invasion because of the climate of tension that was created by the lobbying effort. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was largely a propaganda issue,
which the military lobby used to “sell” its cold war policies to the public and to the government.

Afghanistan: A Second Consideration

There is an obvious counter-explanation to the invasion of Afghanistan, that of the realists. According to the realist view, the invasion was interpreted as a major security threat because it really was such a threat. This approach emphasizes that Afghanistan is close to the Persian Gulf, which is where the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries and Japan obtain most of their vital petroleum supplies. Some analysts also note that the Soviets had long sought a warm water port, with direct access to the Indian Ocean. The occupation of Afghanistan positioned the USSR much closer to its historic objectives, bringing the Soviets within several hundred miles of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Virtually all analysts at the time agreed with Jimmy Carter’s conclusion that the invasion was “the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.” The “strategic importance of Afghanistan” was immediately and almost universally accepted. Only rarely was it challenged, and even recent analyses still assume that Afghanistan was indeed a strategic prize. Upon close scrutiny, this explanation seems dubious. Afghanistan is not, in fact, very close to the Persian Gulf; Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were actually equidistant from the Gulf. Moreover, Afghanistan’s extremely rugged terrain, lack of infrastructure, and general economic backwardness greatly limited its value. Declassified U.S. government documents underscore Afghanistan’s lack of strategic importance. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, for example, the United States refused to provide Afghanistan with military equipment and contributed only very limited economic aid. A 1949 report by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff succinctly noted: “Afghanistan is of little or no strategic importance to the United States.”

Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was viewed in lackadaisical terms. In 1950, the Soviet role was seen as very minor, and the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate noted that the “Soviet Union has shown no considerable interest in Afghanistan.” Soviet influence did increase considerably beginning in 1954–1955, however, when the USSR began establishing a series of commercial and military links with Afghanistan. Thereafter, the USSR became the country’s main trading partner, as well as its largest source of economic aid and military training. During the next twenty-five years, Afghanistan became economically and militarily dependent upon the USSR, but U.S. officials were not particularly alarmed by this development. Overwhelmingly, these officials believed that the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was a direct response to increased U.S. involvement in the region, especially the U.S. decision, in early 1954, to arm Pakistan. A 1954 National Intelligence
Estimate regarded the upsurge in Soviet interest this way: "Increased Soviet attention to Afghanistan is part of a general effort to counter recent Western (particularly U.S.) gains in the Middle East-South Asia area." These U.S. officials compared Soviet influence in Afghanistan with U.S. influence in Latin America. In 1954, CIA director Allen Dulles commented that "the Soviets were inclined to look on Afghanistan much as the United States did on Guatemala." In 1956, the National Security Council (NSC) explicitly decided not to match Soviet aid activities in Afghanistan, presumably because the country was not considered sufficiently important.

It is tempting, in retrospect, to view such analyses as naive; it may be argued that subsequent events—the fact that the Soviets did eventually invade the country—attest to the fact that U.S. government officials were simply mistaken and were too inclined to trust Soviet intentions in Afghanistan. This interpretation is incorrect. U.S. analysts realized that the country had some geostrategic significance since it bordered the USSR; it was recognized that the Soviets were concerned about developments in border regions. However, U.S. officials generally believed that the Soviets gained little offensive strategic value from their relations with Afghanistan.

U.S. officials also recognized that an eventual Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was possible (although it was considered unlikely) and were not very troubled by this prospect. The 1954 National Intelligence Estimate for Afghanistan noted that "physical occupation of the country would offer few if any strategic advantages to the USSR." Elsewhere, the report qualified this conclusion somewhat, noting that the country might be of some importance, because of its location as a buffer between the USSR and the Indian subcontinent, but the report also noted: "Afghanistan's primitive economy, undeveloped resources, negligible military capabilities, and lack of useful strategic facilities severely restrict its positive value to either side in the East-West power struggle."

Despite all of these considerations, a 1954 NSC briefing paper considered the hypothetical possibility of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and suggested the following U.S. responses to such an invasion: First, the United States should use "diplomatic measures" to encourage Soviet withdrawal. Second, if such diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful, the United States should "decide in light of the circumstances existing at the time what further action to take through the UN [United Nations] or otherwise." The wording in this memorandum is vague, but it is interesting to note that only diplomatic or UN pressure is discussed; military responses or even economic sanctions are not mentioned at all.

The range of documents, unfortunately, becomes quite scarce for most of the period after the 1950s, but all available evidence suggests that U.S. officials never really changed their view that Afghanistan was a very low priority. The United States continued to provide only limited aid to Afghanistan
and never attempted to match the Soviet aid program. The general lack of U.S. interest in Afghanistan persisted through the mid-1970s, through both Democratic and Republican administrations. In general, observers stressed Afghanistan’s lack of strategic importance, and dissenters were very infrequent. Analysts who emphasized Afghanistan’s “strategic” significance were often dismissed in government circles. A 1973 Wall Street Journal article ridiculed the idea that Afghanistan was valuable and offered this caustic assessment:

Petro-pundits tend somehow to equate Soviet influence in land-locked Afghanistan with Soviet control of the Persian Gulf .... But from up close, Afghanistan tends to look less like a fulcrum or a domino or a stepping stone than like a vast expanse of desert waste. ... A visitor perhaps may be excused for wondering why the Russians, or anyone else for that matter, would particularly want Afghanistan.

The article was entitled “Do the Russians Covet Afghanistan? If So, It’s Hard to Figure Why” and referred to Afghanistan as “a vast wasteland” and a “nation probably no one wants.”

In April 1978, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan—the Afghan communist party—seized power, and the country quite suddenly came into the center of world attention. Soviet conduct over the next ten years did not give strong evidence that Afghanistan was strategically important for the West. The Soviets took no action that suggested that they would use Afghanistan for further aggression in the region. The Soviets did not mass their troops on the border with Pakistan or Iran. They did not bring in strategic equipment, such as long- or medium-range bombers, which could have been used for expansion beyond Afghanistan; nor is there any evidence that they brought in antiship missiles, which would have been effective for interdicting Western oil shipments in the Persian Gulf. Most important, U.S. intelligence repeatedly indicated that the Soviets failed even to lengthen the runways of their Afghan airfields or to make the improvements in these airfields that would have been necessary to accommodate long-range jets. The Soviets’ postinvasion military buildup provided no evidence that they sought to use Afghanistan as a staging area for additional aggression.

It is very interesting to note that when the Soviets finally withdrew from Afghanistan, U.S. officials publicly acknowledged, once again, that the country was not of major strategic significance. Shortly before the last Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, a New York Times correspondent wrote the following:

[American officials] say Afghanistan has little intrinsic strategic significance. “There’s no compelling political interest there,” a senior administration official said. ... [According to a former State Department official], “Afghanistan
could turn into one of those chronic third world conflicts ... and our tendency would be to close the book." ... "The bottom line is that Afghanistan is not Iran," said an administration official. "It has no oil reserves and isn't located on the Persian Gulf. It's not a particular strategic prize. We have to be realistic about that."73

U.S. views of Afghanistan have thus come full circle: U.S. officials now acknowledge that Afghanistan is not very important.

In short, the realist explanation for the U.S. response is quite weak. The Carter administration interpreted Afghanistan to be strategic, due to intense and continuous pressures from the military-industrial complex, specifically, the various promilitary lobby groups discussed earlier. There is no reason to doubt that representatives of the MIC sincerely believed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was strategically important—such an interpretation was consistent with their group interests. But their perceptions were heavily colored by these interests. Overall, it seems much more plausible to view the invasion as a pretext to justify implementation of a promilitary policy that the MIC favored. And the invasion of Afghanistan was clearly a major asset for the military-industrial complex, as an Air Force Magazine editorial candidly noted in early 1980. The editorial perfunctorily regretted the invasion, but pointed out that, nevertheless, it would help reverse U.S. policy and would "provide a catalyst for putting U.S. foreign and defense policy on the road to renewed credibility." The invasion could "be turned into opportunity and opportunity into advantage."74

Conclusion

This chapter is intended to be only suggestive; a full analysis of the Afghan crisis would go beyond the scope here and would require access to classified materials that are not yet available. A full account of the crisis would surely be more complex than the sketch presented here. U.S. actions were undoubtedly motivated by a range of different factors, of which the military-industrial complex was only one. Yet it is interesting to note that the MIC model seems more consistent with the facts of the case than is the generally accepted realist explanation. Overall, the military-industrial complex approach is a model that is well worth reconsidering, and it deserves far more attention from political scientists.

The model may be especially appropriate at the present time. The U.S. military is, to a significant extent, a product of the cold war. It was largely created and sustained over four decades mainly for one (purported) objective: to deter and/or roll back the Soviet Union. Now that the main enemy has literally ceased to exist, we can expect a new era of military-industrial lobbying and the creation of new foreign "threats" and national security
"crises." It is worth mentioning that the 1989 invasion of Panama makes little sense in a realist framework. At the time of the invasion, the *Economist* noted, "The security of the [Panama] canal, which matters rather less than it did 80 years ago, was not at stake; and U.S. interests are unlikely to benefit much from the removal of General Manuel Noriega, who, though corrupt and brutish, posed no threat to regional stability, still less to the United States itself." The military-industrial complex may have a lot to tell us about U.S. motivations in that invasion, as well as U.S. participation in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Anthony Downs presciently notes that "a bureau threatened by abolition because of a decline in the social significance of its functions must either find new functions or reinstate the importance of its present ones." And inevitably, there will be the "hunt for new business." We should now expect a hunt for new business by the military-industrial complex.
memos are compilations of editorial reactions to the committee and its policy statements in newspapers from across the United States.


77. Herring, America's Longest War, p. 206.

78. See Ferguson and Rogers, Right Turn, chap. 2, for more discussion of business and Nixon.


81. At times, the multinational character of the broadcasting industry has achieved a level where the potential for conflicts of interest become unbelievably serious, such as when Robert Kintner noted for President Johnson in mid-1966 that "the President may be interested in the attached Wall Street Journal article ... which summarizes the awarding of a contract to NBC to assist the South Vietnamese Government in establishing a four-station television network. RCA will sell the equipment; and NBC will manage the stations and train the South Vietnamese. ... For your information, NBC has similar contracts in Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. NBC will receive $250,000 for its first year of service in South Vietnam. These contracts are very profitable to NBC" (memo, Robert E. Kintner for the President, 7/2/66, Ex CO 312, Box 80, WHCF, LBJ Library). Until early 1966, Kintner was president of NBC, when he then became Special Assistant to the president.


84. Several other newspapers competed strongly with the Times to be the paper of record, especially with regard to foreign affairs. For years, the international coverage of the Chicago Daily News was considered to be superior, yet that paper never achieved the influence and elite readership of the Times.

Chapter 2

* I would like to extend thanks to Peter Schraeder and Timothy McKeowan for their comments on a previous draft of this chapter, which has been prepared especially for inclusion in this volume.


26. It may be said that the need for combat is part of the informal “standard operating procedures” that are well-established features of any large organization. See Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), chap. 3.

31. See Max Weber, "Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," in The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949). It should be noted that the MIC might be expected to pressure the government to intervene even in remote areas, which otherwise carry little economic significance. Most mainstream analyses of war and intervention fail to consider this point, and serious misunderstandings can occur. Thus Jeffry Frieden writes: "Any list of reasons for the American interventions in Grenada and Nicaragua, to take more recent examples, would place economic interests far down." However, Frieden fails to consider the economic interests of the defense procurement companies and their role in promoting interventions during this period. See Frieden, "The Economics of Intervention," p. 77.

Frieden's article actually argues that economic interests did influence U.S. interventions during the period 1890–1950. However, the article then accepts the conventional view that economic factors played little or no role in U.S. interventions since World War II. This point seems quite dubious. Even apart from MIC influences, there is considerable evidence that direct investments significantly influenced U.S. interventions during the post–World War II period. See the following sources: Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1983); Ronald W. Cox, Power and Profits: U.S. Economic Policy in Central America (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1994); David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention.

32. The best summary of these events can be found in Halliday, Making of the Second Cold War, chap. 8.


41. It should be noted that most multinational investors do not fall within my definition of the military-industrial complex. The point here is that the multinationals had common interests with the MIC.


43. For an extended analysis, see Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis*.


47. During the 1980 election, for example, *Air Force Magazine* published an article that complained about the “steady, cumulative slide in American military power relative to the Soviet Union” and pointedly urged voters to support candidates who would rectify these problems. See “Dear Voter: An Open Letter to the American Electorate,” *Air Force Magazine*, October 1980, p. 53.


49. “Anti-SALT Lobbyists Outspend Pros 15 to 1,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 March 1979. The article anticipated that the spending would even out in the subsequent months (although it did not say why this trend was anticipated); in any event, the article expected SALT “treaty opponents still spending $7 for every $1 by proponents.”

50. Ferguson and Rogers, *Right Turn*, p. 99. Regarding anti-Soviet economic sanctions, proposed in 1982, Kenneth Rodman writes that “firms like Dresser Industries, Caterpillar Tractor, and General Electric ... were heavily dependent upon contacts with the Soviet bloc” and stood to lose from the proposed sanctions. Rodman astutely recognizes the phenomenon of business opposition to certain cold war policies, but he is incorrect in his implication that the U.S. business community in general stood to lose from the sanctions. Rodman neglects to consider that the defense sector benefited from the prodefense atmosphere that such sanctions tended to foster. See Rodman, “Sanctions at Bay? Hegemonic Decline, Multinational Corporations, and U.S. Economic Sanctions since the Pipeline Case,” *International Organization* 49, no. 1 (1995): 135.


52. See the excellent study on this period, Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis*, chap. 7.


55. Carter, quoted in Garthoff, *Confrontation*, p. 957. However, there were some differences of opinion with regard to Soviet motivations. Some analysts believed that
the Soviets had invaded *with the intention of* spreading their influence throughout the region; others believed that the Soviets may have invaded due to local or idiosyncratic considerations but that, nevertheless, the invasion did in fact give the Soviets major strategic advantages, whether or not this was their actual motivation.

56. This is emphasized in Milan Hayner, *The Soviet War in Afghanistan* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991).


63. See Gibbs, "Does the USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'?" pp. 368-369.


65. Ibid., pp. 1483, 1484, 1492.


67. A secret CIA report in 1973 analyzed a coup d'état in Afghanistan in that year. It was noted that 200 Soviet technicians were in the country at the time; but the report concluded that "there is no evidence, however, that the Soviets either instigated or were actively involved in the coup" (Central Intelligence Agency, "Biographic Report: Mohammad Daud," 13 August 1973, reprinted verbatim in *Den of Spies* document collection [Tehran], vol. 29, p. 42).


69. It should also be noted that the period from April 1978, when the People's Democratic Party seized power, to December 1979, when the USSR invaded the country, provides considerable evidence that the Soviets were not at all eager to increase their commitment to Afghanistan. This is strongly indicated by recently declassified Soviet documents from the period prior to the invasion. See verbatim transcripts of these documents in "From Hesitation to Intervention: Soviet Decisions on Afghanistan, 1979," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, no. 4, 1994, pp. 70-76. See also the following analysis of Soviet activities in Afghanistan that analyzes recently available Soviet documents: Odd Arne Westad, "Prelude to Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Communists, 1978-1979," *International History Review* 16, no. 1 (1994).

It is interesting to note that these recent Soviet releases tend to confirm earlier interpretations of Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, which had argued—without access
to then-secret documents—that the Soviets were not enthusiastic about the Afghan communist party. See the following: Garthoff, *Confrontation*; John P. Willerton, "Soviet Perspectives on Afghanistan: The Making of an Ally," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 1 (1986); and Gibbs, "Does the USSR Have a ‘Grand Strategy’?"

70. It is worth mentioning that a vast quantity of U.S. government documents, pertaining to Afghanistan during 1978–1979, are now available. These documents strongly suggest that the Soviets invaded, at last in part, to subdue recalcitrant elements in the Afghan communist party. For analyses of these document collections, see Gibbs, ibid., and Garthoff, ibid., chap. 26.


74. The editorial noted that previous communist actions, such as the invasion of South Korea in 1950 helped to trigger increased expenditures on the military. The editorial concluded that "the Soviets [by invading Afghanistan], once again, may inadvertently save us from ourselves" ("Afghanistan: A Watershed," *Air Force Magazine*, February 1980). For a very interesting comparison between crises in Afghanistan and Korea, see Fred Block, “Economic Instability and Military Strength: The Paradoxes of the 1950 Rerarmament Decision,” *Politics and Society* 10, no. 1 (1980).


Chapter 3

1. Richard Perle and Richard Pipes are key exponents of the very widespread view that legitimate national security concerns, rather than domestic societal interests, shaped the turn to a more assertive U.S. foreign and military policy under Ronald Reagan. Although certain realists differ with this view by acknowledging that the Soviet threat has often been exaggerated, they still share the common assumption that foreign policymakers are motivated—rationally or not—by national security concerns and anticommunist ideology. For an example of this latter view, see: Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).


3. Thomas Ferguson is perhaps the leading proponent of this approach, one he labels the "investment theory of politics." See Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New