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THE PRINCIPLE OF 'FIRST DO NO HARM'

David N Gibbs

Everybody knows that the boat is leaking,
Everybody knows that the captain lied.

Leonard Cohen

Introduction

This chapter will focus on the potential dangers of military intervention, emphasizing the category of intervention that is undertaken with the professed aim of alleviating humanitarian crises - what has popularly become known as 'humanitarian intervention'. The concept of military intervention has undergone a considerable transformation in recent years. Prior to 1989, intervention was usually viewed quite dimly, as a cynical act of power politics, one that was expected to produce negative results from a human rights standpoint. Accordingly, the practice was widely condemned. In 1981, for example, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution, which reads: 'no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state' (United Nations (UN) 1981). Writers during this era often focused on non-military means for alleviating humanitarian crises, through the use of external mediation or peacekeeping forces, who were expected to act with impartiality (Harbottle 1970; see also Hammarskjöld 1975).

Since the ending of the Cold War, military intervention has been seen in a far more positive light. Increasingly, interventionist actions by the United States and its allies have been viewed as altruistic acts that aim to prevent or curtail genocide, and such associated atrocities as ethnic cleansing, torture and rape. In general, it is the reluctance to intervene that is seen as cynical and immoral. The most prominent exposition of this new pro-interventionist position is Samantha Power's 2002 book 'A Problem from Hell': America and the Age of Genocide, which strongly condemned past instances where the US or other states failed to intervene against purported acts of genocide. Power (2002) emphasized the moral duty of states to use military force to protect innocent victims and punish the perpetrators of atrocities. While non-military means were also mentioned by Power, it was clearly military force that was most emphasized. This new pro-interventionist position, most clearly enunciated by Power, has also produced a large body of writings by academics, journalists and policymakers, especially in the US and Europe, which
demands increased interventionist actions with a humanitarian purpose. The idea of humanitarian intervention has profoundly influenced international relations, and has become enshrined in the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, passed by the UN General Assembly, which contains a strongly pro-interventionist tone (Evans 2008). Power herself has become a major figure in the policymaking of the Obama administration, and at the time of writing is serving as US Ambassador to the United Nations. The idea of humanitarian intervention has influenced a generation of idealistic college students; one of the most influential political movements on campuses in the United States has focused on the need for more, not less, US intervention overseas, most strikingly with regard to the recent ‘Save Darfur’ movement (see Mandani 2010).

A major thrust of the writings on humanitarian intervention is the widespread assumption that intervention will improve the human rights situation in targeted countries. A key problem with this view is that intervention could quite easily worsen the humanitarian crisis it was intended to correct. It is often forgotten that humanitarian intervention is a form of warfare, and war by its very nature has great potential to increase the scale of human rights abuses, including genocide.

In this chapter, I will discuss some of the potential dangers of humanitarian intervention, focusing especially on the danger that intervention may lead to increased killing and atrocities, either as a direct result of external military action, as directed by the intervening powers, or by agitating underlying social conflicts and thereby augmenting the scale of killing by internal forces. There is the associated danger that the focus on intervention may undermine efforts to settle ethnic conflicts through negotiation and diplomacy. The basic point here is to advance a ‘First Do No Harm’ concept which emphasizes that intervention states must carefully weigh the potential danger of military action, and the associated danger that such action will worsen the humanitarian crisis it was intended to resolve. I further argue that in most cases, the dangers of intervention far outweigh the potential benefits. To illustrate these problems, I will draw primarily from the interventionist experiences in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo during the 1990s, as well as more recent instances of US and international wars since the Balkan interventions.

Problem of over-emphasizing military force as a solution to crises

A major problem in humanitarian intervention is its single-minded focus on military force, which often precludes the possibility of negotiated and non-violent solutions to humanitarian crises. Much of the problem flows from the rhetoric and narrative style that emanates from advocates of intervention. Typically, humanitarian crises are reduced to good and evil struggles, whereby the perpetrators of atrocities are compared to the Nazis, led by a Hitler-like figure. Particularly noteworthy is the effective redefinition of genocide, which is increasingly used to refer to intentional ethnic killings of any size (Tokáč 2006). Some writers go even further and argue that genocide can be defined to include mass expulsion of populations, which presumably would include situations where no deaths occur (Ronayne 2004: 61). There has been an effective blurring in the line between genocide and other categories of crime, which has been the subject of criticism among legal scholars (see Southwick 2005). Given the new emphasis on genocide and the enormous power of that word, discussions of humanitarian crises and interventions assume a heavily emotional quality.

In such a context, international efforts to resolve crises through negotiations and compromise between warring parties may seem objectionable in principle, comparable with the 1938 Munich appeasement of the Nazis; diplomats who participate in such efforts are condemned as modern day reincarnations (Sunday Times 1994). Corre course of action, a position the response to most foreign resort. In the response to 3 (emphasis added). Given the New Republic view would suh Such high-minded attitudes atmosphere that impedes can intensify human suffering.

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modern day reincarnations of Neville Chamberlain (see for example Vulliamy 1998; New Sunday Times 1994). Correspondingly, military interventions appear as the only reasonable course of action, a position nicely summed up by an editorial in the New Republic (2006): 'In the response to most foreign policy crises, the use of military force is properly viewed as a last resort. In the response to genocide, the use of military force is properly viewed as a first resort' (emphasis added). Given the very broad definitions of genocide that are now being used, the New Republic view would suggest a strong predisposition in favor of force, instead of compromise. Such high-minded attitudes can have a negative impact on humanitarian crises, by creating an atmosphere that impedes early settlement of conflicts, which can in turn prolong wars and thus intensify human suffering.

The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina offers an illustration of this basic problem. In early 1992, in response to the gradual breakup of the Yugoslav federation, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina began preparing itself for full independence. There was a widely recognized danger of war among the three ethnic constituencies: the Muslims, Croats and Serbs. In response to this danger, the European Community dispatched a negotiating team led by Portuguese diplomat José Cutileiro. In February and March 1992, at a conference in Lisbon, Cutileiro was able to establish a tentative agreement among the leaders of the three ethnic groups (including the elected Bosnian government, led by President Alija Izetbegović, who represented the Muslim ethnic group). Cutileiro worked out a plan to divide Bosnia into three separate regions, each of which would possess a high level of autonomy. The central government in Sarajevo would be left with only limited powers, as part of a decentralized state. Of the total area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs were to be given effective control in areas comprising 45 per cent of the total, the Muslims would receive 42.5 per cent and the Croats would receive 12.5 per cent (Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) 2003: Part I, Chapter 5, Section 3).

The resulting Lisbon agreement was only accepted in a preliminary form, with many details to be worked out, and there was no absolute guarantee the plan would be successful. However, the initial agreement was certainly promising, as it was endorsed by the leaders of all three ethnic groups. Even the now infamous Radovan Karadžić, who represented the Serbs at Lisbon, called the agreement 'a great day for Bosnia and Herzegovina' (quoted in Binder 1993). Of course, Karadžić would later engage in mass war crimes, but in early 1992, he was apparently willing to accept a compromise, based on the principle that such compromise was better than war.

Almost immediately after the initial success, the last US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, encouraged the Bosnian Muslims to withdraw from the agreement. A New York Times account (Binder 1993) offered the following assessment: 'Immediately after Mr. Izetbegović returned from Lisbon, Mr. Zimmermann called on him... "[Izetbegović] said he didn’t like [the Lisbon agreement]"', Mr. Zimmermann recalled. "I told him if he didn’t like it, why sign it?"'. That Zimmermann and other US officials encouraged the Muslims to withdraw from the agreement has been confirmed by other sources, including former State Department official George Kenney and British diplomat Lord Peter Carrington (both interviewed in Bogdanich 2002). Cutileiro (1995) himself later stated that 'Izetbegović and his aides were encouraged to scupper that [Lisbon] deal by well-meaning outsiders' — which was probably a polite reference to the US activities. A Dutch investigation into the Bosnia war has also confirmed that the US government sought to undermine the Lisbon agreement, and to prevent its implementation (see NIOD 2003: Part I, Chapter 5, Section 3).

The US motives in undermining the Lisbon agreement are complex (for more discussion of this issue, see Gibbs 2009: Chapters 2, 5). One influence on US policy that we will note was
the strong advocacy of humanitarian intervention that issued from the press, in response to Serb atrocities that were committed in Croatia, along with a fear that even worse atrocities might soon occur in Bosnia. Serb atrocities during the battle of Vukovar elicited special concern. Shortly before the Lisbon Agreement, a New York Times editorial (1991) declared: 'To stare at this picture of unburied bodies from the siege of Vukovar in bleeding Croatia is to see the need for the world to act' – with a strong implication that military action was required. The editorial distilled a gathering consensus for military intervention, which became even more emphatic over time, and which made it increasingly difficult to achieve a compromise settlement. In the charged atmosphere that resulted, any type of negotiation appeared as immoral.

The results of this moral crusade proved tragic. Both the Croats and Muslims withdrew from the Lisbon Agreement, confident that the US government supported their decisions, which led to a general breakdown of the talks (Gibbs 2009: 110). The war began almost immediately, and lasted for well over three years, with enormous human suffering and large-scale atrocities against civilians, with an especially heavy toll among civilians of the Muslim ethnic group. The 1998–1999 Kosovo conflict provides an additional illustration of how the crusading atmosphere that is often associated with humanitarian intervention can impede negotiations. Let us begin with some background: Kosovo had long existed as a province of the Republic of Serbia, first during the period of the Yugoslav federation, and then after Yugoslavia's breakup as well. The province itself was divided between an Albanian majority and a much smaller Serb community, with extended conflict between the two ethnic groups. In the course of this ethnic conflict, the Republic of Serbia and its president Slobodan Milošević openly sided with the Kosovar Serbs, and inflicted considerablereprisal against the majority Albanians.

During 1998, there had been a substantial upsurge of fighting between Serb army forces and the Albanian-led Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which sought full independence for Kosovo, under Albanian rule. At least initially, US officials appear to have been open to a negotiated settlement. In October 1998, US and other NATO diplomats under Richard Holbrooke brokered a deal with Milošević that required the Serbs to cease offensive operations, to remove their troops from areas of Kosovo that had been recently occupied, and to allow an international group of observers to confirm the troop withdrawals. At the same time, however, the international media also began to show augmented interest in the Kosovo conflict; and press reports used many of the same themes from the earlier Bosnia war, which combined emotional condemnation of the Serbs with calls for military intervention. The US efforts at negotiation were directly criticized. An editorial in the Toronto Star (1998), for example, called the Holbrooke agreement a surrender to Milošević. The editorial added that the agreement was 'morally bankrupt', since it 'lets the madman Slobodan Milošević get away with genocide'. Similarly uncompromising rhetoric issued from much of the rest of the media in North America, as well as Europe, and it does appear to have influenced policymakers.

Despite these criticisms, the Serbs largely implemented the terms of the agreement, a point that has been confirmed by German General Klaus Naumann. General Naumann was part of the NATO negotiating team that helped broker the October agreement (he later played a key role in directing the NATO war against Serbia, and then served as a prosecution witness at the Milošević trial). With regard to the Holbrooke agreement, Naumann (2002: 6994–6995) stated that the Serb leaders 'honored the [Holbrooke] agreement ... I think one has to really pay tribute to what the [Serb] authorities did. This was not an easy thing to bring 6,000 police officers back within 24 hours, but they managed'.

The successful implementation of the Serb troop pull-back could have led to a comprehensive settlement of the war, had the United States been willing to seek such an agreement. Unfortunately, the initial US interest in diplomacy seems to have faded rather quickly, as we will soon see. Another problem the Serb restraining, and indeed Instead, the KLA used the Serl and they attacked Serb persons general collapse of the Holbrooke

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ld have led to a comprehensive to seek such an agreement. we faded rather quickly, as we will soon see. Another problem was that the Kosovo Liberation Army made no effort to match the Serb restraint, and indeed they were not encouraged to do so by the US government. Instead, the KLA used the Serb troop pull-back as an opportunity to launch a new offensive, and they attacked Serb personnel in isolated areas, which led in turn to Serb retaliation and a general collapse of the Holbrooke agreement.

In public, Western officials overwhelmingly blamed the Serbs for the breakdown of the Holbrooke agreement and for the return to combat. In private, however, they admitted that it was the Albanians who undermined the agreement. This point has been confirmed by an investigator with the BBC (2002: 2), who stated: 'We've obtained confidential minutes of the North Atlantic Council ... NATO's governing body. The talk was of the KLA as the "main initiator of the violence ... It launched what appears to be a deliberate campaign of provocation [against the Serbs]'". The United States made no effort to restrain the KLA. In fact, around the time that these provocations commenced, the United States began providing direct support to the KLA for the first time (Walker and Laverty 2000), now effectively establishing the Albanian-led group as America's ally in the conflict. The breakdown of the Holbrooke agreement led to escalating violence on both sides, culminating in a series of Serb-perpetrated massacres, including one in the town of Ražak in January 1999, which achieved special notoriety.

The Western powers made an effort to achieve a diplomatic solution to the conflict, and brought both the KLA and the Serbian government together at Rambouillet, France. Though the Rambouillet negotiations were to take place under the supervision of the French and British, US officials would play a key behind-the-scenes role. It seems likely that US officials had already decided upon a strategy of war and were simply using the Rambouillet talks to establish a pretext for war. This strategy was strongly implied by British official John Gilbert, who served as the deputy British Defence Minister, in charge of military intelligence. In 2000, Gilbert testified before parliament (and largely defended the NATO war, but he also admitted the following key point): 'I think certain people [in NATO] were spoiling for a fight ... the terms put to Milosevic at Rambouillet were absolutely intolerable: How could he possibly accept them[?] It was quite deliberate'. Gilbert (2000: paragraph 1086) added that 'we were at a point when some people felt that something had to be done, so you just provoked a fight'.

Efforts to undermine the Rambouillet peace talks were unfortunate, since the Serbs do seem to have been ready for a comprehensive settlement. During the course of negotiations, the Serbs accepted most of the NATO political demands, which consisted of requirements that the Serbs restore regional autonomy to Kosovo, as well as an end to political repression against Albanian groups. Toward the end of the conference, the Serbs 'seemed to have embraced the political elements of the settlement, at least in principle', according to Marc Weller (1999: 475), who served as an advisor to the Albanian delegation. State Department official James Rubin (2000) claims that the Serbs had agreed to 'nearly every aspect of the political agreement'. The Serbs also agreed in principle to the idea of an international peacekeeping force, to observe implementation of any agreement (Posen 2000: 47).

The possibility of a final agreement was blocked, however, when a new provision was introduced to the peace plan by the NATO negotiators, which was contained in the 'Military Annex' to the agreement. This Annex provided for a multinational peacekeeping force that would have unimpeded access not only to Kosovo, but to the whole of Serbia as well.  

When this new provision was introduced, the Serbs considered it to be so outrageous that they effectively refused to negotiate any further. An investigation by the UK House of Commons (2000: Section 65) later concluded that the Military Annex 'would never have been acceptable to the Yugoslav [Serb] side, since it was a significant infringement on its sovereignty'. It is tempting to view the inclusion of this Annex as a careless oversight, which inadvertently

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undermined the negotiation process. However, the Gilbert testimony, noted above, suggests that its inclusion was more likely part of a deliberate effort ("it was quite deliberate") to sabotage the agreement, and thus create a pretext for bombing. Whatever the intention, the Rambovillet talks did indeed break down, and the 78-day NATO bombing campaign took place soon after. The Bosnia and Kosovo cases thus illustrate how calls for humanitarian intervention can become moral crusades, which may overemphasize military action and undercut potential diplomatic solutions to crises. In addition to the Bosnia and Kosovo cases presented here, there are other instances where the interventionist thrust impeded negotiations. During the Libyan civil war in 2011, Muammar Gaddafi was probably open to a negotiated settlement, consistent with UN resolutions, but this was effectively blocked by key NATO governments, which were eager to settle the problem through military action and regime change (see Roberts 2011: 10–11). During the Darfur crisis, there is evidence that persistent demands for military intervention—though never acted upon—impeded negotiations, and prolonged the war (De Waal 2007). In short, the crusading atmosphere that suffuses discussions of humanitarian intervention implicitly privileges the use of violent methods of conflict resolution over nonviolent methods, and this situation runs the risk of intensifying or prolonging conflicts, with highly negative consequences from a humanitarian standpoint. These examples illustrate a basic point of the ‘First Do No Harm’ principle: that popular demands for intervention, however well intended, can cause enormous damage.

Risk of increasing the level of casualties and human suffering

Another risk is that a military intervention itself may increase the level of human suffering, beyond what had occurred prior to the intervention. Once again, the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo provide useful illustrations of a more basic problem. In Bosnia, the US and its allies opted for a military strategy, beginning in August 1995. Advocates of intervention had long favored decisive US and NATO military action to end the Bosnia war, and they finally achieved their objective when the Clinton administration endorsed offensive action. A key component of the offensive plans involved the Republic of Croatia, which was expected to assist the Bosnian government in defeating the Serbs. The operation commenced with a Croatian government attack on ethnic Serbs within the Republic of Croatia, mostly in the Krajina region, near the border with Bosnia. With US support, the Croatian military quickly defeated the Serbs and crossed the border into western Bosnia, where they linked up with Bosnian government forces for a joint offensive against ethnic Serbs within Bosnia. During the period August through October 1995, the combined Bosnian–Croatian thrust was highly successful in defeating Serb forces, and rolling back their previous gains, from earlier phases of the war. These offensives were strongly supported by the US government, which had been assisting both the Croatian and Bosnian government forces in their military preparations since 1994 (see account in Gibbs 2009: Chapter 6). In addition, the US and other NATO states undertook a two-week bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, termed Operation Deliberate Force, to support the ground offensive. Following these combined military actions, the United States organized peace talks in Dayton Ohio, which produced the Dayton Accords of December 1995, ending the war in Bosnia (and also in Croatia).

These military operations produced a humanitarian disaster. The offensives in Bosnia and Croatia generated approximately 250,000 refugees, most of whom were Serb civilians who had lived in Krajina long before the war had begun. The expelled persons also included large numbers of ethnic Muslims from the Bihać region of Bosnia, who were opposed to the Izetbegović government and were thus suspect. In addition to this mass ethnic cleansing, the combined offensives killed se Ripley (1998: 316). There is smaller than the cumulated to the years of war, in both C atrocities that attended the A Krajina alone, the Croatian at since the Soviet Union crust official (paraphrased in Perlez a great deal different from the several other peace plans that (on the latter, see Owen 19 Dayton Accords, there was an additional 100,000 refugees ( had the main effect of sub intensifying the humanitarian The Kosovo case provides intervention can have the to reduce. At the outset, it the March–June 1999, the war in both sides of the conflict for civilians and combatants, an intervention against Serbia especially those perpetrated effect, and it greatly increase chairman of the Joint Chief campaign risked provoking S is exactly what occurred.

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The offensives in Croatia and were Serb civilians who had persons also included large who were opposed to the mass ethnic cleansing, the combined offensives killed several thousand civilians, according to June’s correspondent Tim Ripley (1998: 316). There is no doubt that these episodes of ethnic cleansing were substantially smaller than the cumulative rounds of cleansing that had been perpetrated by the Serbs during the years of war, in both Croatia and Bosnia. These facts notwithstanding, the anti-Serb atrocities that attended the August–October 1995 offensives were substantial all the same. In Krajina alone, the Croatian attack generated ‘the largest single movement of refugees in Europe since the Soviet Union crushed the Hungarian uprising in 1956’, according to a Red Cross official (paraphrased in Perlez 1995). The Dayton Accords that followed the offensive were not a great deal different from the Lisbon agreement of 1992, which the US helped to sabotage, and several other peace plans that were presented subsequent to Lisbon during the course of the war (on the latter, see Owen 1998). And then in 1996, shortly after the implementation of the Dayton Accords, there was yet another round of anti-Serb ethnic cleansing, which produced an additional 100,000 refugees (Bildt 1998: 196–198). Overall, the military intervention of 1995 had the main effect of substantially escalating the level of atrocities against civilians, and intensifying the humanitarian catastrophe.

The Kosovo case provides an even clearer illustration of the way that humanitarian intervention can have the perverse effect of increasing the human suffering it was meant to reduce. At the outset, it should be noted that prior to the NATO bombing campaign of March–June 1999, the war had been relatively low level. The total number of persons killed on both sides of the conflict prior to the breakout of the Rambouillet talks, including both civilians and combatants, was in the range of 2,000 (Judah 2002: 226). The 1999 NATO intervention against Serbia was intended to stop the fighting and the resulting atrocities, especially those perpetrated against the Albanian ethnic group; in reality it had the opposite effect, and it greatly increased atrocities several fold. In early 1999, General Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned President Clinton that any NATO bombing campaign risked provoking Serb revenge attacks against the Albanians (Sunday Times 1999): this is exactly what occurred.

During the course of the 78-day NATO bombing campaign, the Serbs hugely increased the scale of their violence. By the end of the campaign, when Milosevic finally capitulated to NATO demands, the total number of Albanians who died in the war was in the range of 10,000, far more than had died in the earlier, pre-bombing phase. There was also a huge escalation in the scale of Serb-perpetrated ethnic cleansing after the bombing commenced; by the time the war ended in June, virtually the entire Albanian population of Kosovo had been displaced. In addition, the NATO air strikes killed some 500 and 2,000 civilians, which suggests that the bombing itself may well have killed about as many civilians as all the months of fighting that had preceded it (see Ball 2002: 2166; UK House of Commons 2000: Section 94; Judah 2002: 264). When one combines the numbers of people killed by Serb reprisals (post-bombing) with the number of people killed directly by the bombing itself, the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo offers a remarkable illustration of how intervention can worsen and intensify a humanitarian crisis.

When the bombing ended, the Serbs agreed to a NATO peace plan that entailed an end to the Serb military occupation of Kosovo, the restoration of Kosovo’s regional autonomy, and an international peacekeeping force to oversee implementation of the agreement (see documents in Auerswald et al. 2000: 1079–1081; 1101–1106). Note that the Serbs had already accepted all of these points in principle at the Rambouillet conference. A similar agreement could probably have been achieved without bombing. And following the Serb capitulation in June 1999, the now victorious Albanians unleashed a mass campaign of ethnic cleansing directed against Serbs and other disfavored groups (an event that was reminiscent of the situation in
Bosnia (following the Dayton Accords). Anonymous vigilantes killed hundreds of Serbs throughout the province, causing a majority of the population to flee to Serbia, along with many Roma, who also were viewed suspiciously by the Albanian majority. Some 230,000 persons were effectively expelled from Kosovo in the months following the NATO attack (Sunday Times 2000; BBC 2003). Once again, it seems difficult to reconcile these facts with any reasonable idea of humanitarianism.

The danger that intervention may worsen a humanitarian crisis and increase suffering has been shown in other cases as well. Especially striking examples of such augmented suffering are the US and allied interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, associated with the larger War on Terror, following the 2001 terrorist attacks. While these interventions were primarily designed to combat terrorism, it is often forgotten that they were simultaneously intended as humanitarian interventions, which sought to liberate the Iraqi and Afghan peoples from oppressive regimes. The humanitarian aspects of these interventions was especially emphasized by Western intellectuals who supported the actions (see essays in Cushman 2005). And yet, these invasions have mired both countries in disastrous wars, which have lasted well over a decade, with hundreds of thousands of unnecessary deaths.

Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has argued that humanitarian intervention has the potential to create enormous harm, especially to the target population that the intervention is supposed to help. Given the brief length of this chapter, however, I have merely scratched the surface regarding the damaging effect of intervention. Another source of damage, which I will mention briefly, is the misallocation of financial resources. Interventions can be quite expensive, often running into the billions or tens of billions of dollars. The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan present extreme cases of overspending, as their combined long-term cost is projected to reach or exceed $4 trillion (Bilmes 2013). One wonders whether military intervention was the most effective use of this money. Perhaps the enormous sums dedicated to military interventions could be better spent — with far greater humanitarian impact — on such inexpensive yet chronically underfunded activities as the control of polio, malaria, schistosomiasis and other diseases. With overspending on military intervention, fewer resources will be available for non-violent forms of humanitarian action.

There are still other potential dangers: Several recent interventions have seriously weakened international norms with regard to nuclear disarmament: both Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein eliminated national programs aimed at achieving nuclear weapons, presumably in the hope that doing so would enable their states to have better relations with the United States and its allies; yet both dictators ended up being overthrown and executed. These events may well have influenced North Korea (and possibly other countries) that nuclear weapons are essential to prevent Western interventions — which are clearly negative outcomes with regard to world security. The regime change that often accompanies intervention may generate extended periods of instability in the target country, and also in the surrounding region; the 2011 overthrow of Gaddafi, for example, has destabilized not only Libya, but also neighboring Mali (see Gibbs 2013). In addition, recent interventions have the potential to weaken international law, as several of these (most notably Kosovo and Iraq) were undertaken without UN Security Council approval. The recent enthusiasm for military intervention as a solution to humanitarian crises thus seems misplaced. Often lost in such discussions is the fact that intervention — like medical action — runs the risk of making a situation worse than before.

1. www.leonardcohen.com/
2. In fairness, the Evans book non-military aspects of the doctrine tend to ignore intervention.
3. Note that this chapter will of 'First Do No Harm' has Robinson 1999.
4. Cuttellero also notes that agreement, but these were
5. For the record, I note th However, Zimmermann's beyond the Times article, at
6. Overall, I have argued that NATO alliance, for the pot chapter, however, I empty activists and journalists serve
US policy (see Gibbs 2009:170).
7. Subsequent efforts by British official David C provide extensive details on hampered by pro-intervention compromise with the Serbs
8. It seems likely that the offer introduced by General We 2002: 162–163).
9. Note that the precise statement is the Shah the express Rambouillet Military Annex Kosovo was quietly dropped.
10. At the time of the Iraqi invasion for all the concerns one million murdered 80,000 regime flies.

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BBC 2003 'Kosovo minorities' in: Europe
Bildt, C 1998 Peace Journey: The
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Future National Security Budget
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Binder, D 1993 'US policymaker
28 August.
Bogdanich, G 2002 Yugoslavia: 7
com/tide/ct0314930/reviews.
The principle of 'First Do No Harm'

Notes
2. In fairness, the Evans book is more carefully written than that of Power, and it does discuss at length non-military aspects of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. However, the popular discussions of this doctrine tend to ignore these qualifications and to focus almost exclusive attention on military intervention.
3. Note that this chapter will deal mainly with issues relating to military intervention. The basic concept of 'First Do No Harm' has also been applied to the dangers of providing aid in conflict situations (see Robinson 1999).
4. Cuéllar also notes that some feeble efforts were made into the summer of 1992 to rescue the agreement, but these were unsuccessful.
5. For the record, I note that former Ambassador Zimmerman denied sabotaging the agreement. However, Zimmernann's role in sabotaging the agreement has been confirmed by other sources, beyond the Times article, as noted above. For the denial, see Zimmerman (1993).
6. Overall, I have argued that the main US motive in the Balkans was to reestablish the importance of the NATO alliance, for the post-Cold War period, and thus to advance US geo-strategic interests. In this chapter, however, I emphasize how popular crusades for humanitarian intervention by political activists and journalists served to reinforce these geo-strategic motives and thus influenced the overall US policy (see Gibbs 2009: Chapter 7).
7. Subsequent efforts by the EU to resolve the Bosnian war during 1992–1995 were largely directed by British official David Owen, who worked closely with UN officials. Owen's (1998) memoirs provide extensive details on negotiation efforts during this period, and show that these efforts were hampered by pro-interventionist elements, especially in the United States, who seemed to view all compromise with the Serbs as unacceptable.
8. It seems likely that the offending clause allowing for the peacekeepers to have full access to Serbia was introduced by General Wesley Clark and his staff, who helped to draft the Military Annex (Clark 2002: 162–163).
9. Note that the precise statements in the final agreements were in certain respects more favorable toward the Serbs than the proposed Rambouillet documentation. Critically, the original clause in the Rambouillet Military Annex – which called for peacekeeping forces to have access to Serbia as well as Kosovo – was quietly dropped (Posen 2000: 79–81).
10. At the time of the Iraqi invasion, Juan Cole (2002) offered this endorsement: 'I remain convinced that, for all the concerns one might have about the aftermath, the removal of Saddam Hussein and the murderous Baath regime from power will be worth the sacrifices that are about to be made on all sides'. With regard to humanitarian justifications for intervention in Afghanistan, see Delphy (2002).

References
The principle of 'First Do No Harm'


