(1977), and *Waiting for the Barbarians* (1980), had already won prizes both within South Africa and beyond, praised for their originality and literary skill. He won a second Booker Prize for *Disgrace* in 1999 and the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2003, sealing his reputation as one of the world’s greatest living writers. Among his other novels are *Foe* (1986), *Age of Iron* (1990), *The Master of Petersburg* (1994), *Elizabeth Costello* (2003), and *Slow Man* (2005), the latter his first novel set in Australia. He has also published two autobiographical works, *Boyhood: Scenes from Provincial Life* (1997) and *Youth* (2002)—although these are better described as fictionalized memoirs, written as they are in the third person—and four collections of essays, including *White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South Africa* (1988) and *Giving Offense: Essays on Censorship* (1996), that demonstrate his deeply thoughtful and scholarly analysis.

Fiercely protective of his own privacy, Coetzee has described himself as believing in “spare prose and a spare, thrifty world.” The ethical and philosophical nature of his writing makes it of interest not only to literary scholars but to a much wider readership.

*See also* South Africa, Republic of: History and Politics (1850–2006).

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


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**COLD WAR.** During the period from 1945 to 1970, Africa was not a major arena for conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. The anticolonial struggles were led at least in their initial phases by relatively privileged social strata. Communist parties in Africa were almost nonexistent (except in South Africa and later Sudan, which did have moderately important communist parties). There were some labor unions, student groups, and political parties that developed radical nationalist or even Marxist orientations, and in several instances these played significant roles in the independence movements (this was especially true with regard to the Parti Démocratique de Guinée, under Ahmed Sékou Touré). But in no case did a communist party lead the struggle against colonialism. These facts reduced the value of Africa to the Soviet Union, and the lack of Soviet interest also reduced U.S. interest. For the most part, U.S. interests in Africa were served by the European colonial powers that vigilantly protected their colonies against any prospective ideological threats.

The first major Cold War conflict was the Congo Crisis of 1960 that followed the Congo’s decolonization from Belgium. To a large extent the Congo Crisis was an asymmetrical Cold War conflict, in that the interveners were overwhelmingly from the United States and its NATO allies. Belgian-supported mercenaries and mining interests helped engineer the secession of mineral-rich Katanga Province, which functioned as a de facto Belgian puppet state for several years. The political turmoil led to the dispatch of a United Nations peacekeeping force that soon became the largest and most important peacekeeping operation of the entire Cold War period.

Recent documentation shows that the UN peacekeepers were sympathetic to American and European interests in the Congo, and they secretly coordinated their activities with those of the United States. In response, the Soviet Union and its allies made a brief effort to furnish military assistance to the elected Congolese prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. However, the Soviets lacked the long-range transport capability that would have been necessary to match the North American interventions. For the Congolese, these external interventions proved highly destabilizing. Lumumba was assassinated by Belgian military forces and allied mercenary groups (with at least indirect encouragement from the CIA). The accession to power by General Joseph-Desire Mobutu in 1965, with strong U.S. and European support, inaugurated one of the more corrupt and divisive rulers of recent African history.

Overall, the Soviet support for Lumumba, however brief and ineffectual, probably gained the Soviet Union some degree of popular support in Africa, especially among intellectual classes. With regard to the war of ideas, the Soviets enjoyed additional advantages. The Soviet Union itself was
(at least in theory) strongly opposed to colonialism. That the Soviets had a record of semicolonial domination of various non-Russian groups within the Soviet Union was generally overlooked at the time. In addition, a new generation of young people throughout Africa became increasingly inclined toward various forms of Marxism and socialism, and these factors also weighed in favor of Soviet influence. These advantages were outweighed, however, by the former colonial powers—that were of course noncommunist— retaining significant economic, cultural, and in some cases military links to their former colonies. In the majority of African states, U.S. and European influence far exceeded Soviet influence throughout the Cold War.

The 1970s brought a new wave of Cold War interventions in Africa. The increased interventionism resulted primarily from fast-paced political change within Africa: Portugal’s colonies all achieved independence during this period; in Ethiopia, the monarchy under Haile Selassie was overthrown in a 1974 revolution and replaced by a Marxist-led military government. And the remaining white-ruled states in Southern Africa came under renewed pressure for change. The Soviet Union (and also Cuba) intervened in several of these conflicts. By this period, the Soviet Union possessed enough transport planes and ships to enable large-scale interventions; this was a capability that they had lacked during the Congo Crisis. The United States, on the other hand, was determined to block these perceived Soviet intrusions into what had long been regarded as an American and European sphere of influence. Even the Chinese were now determined to project their influence into African conflicts, and they generally acted in an adversarial fashion vis-à-vis the USSR.

The result was a series of proxy wars throughout the continent during the 1970s. Cuban troops, supplied by the Soviets, fought in the Angolan civil war; the Cubans and Soviets also supported Ethiopia in a complex series of wars on the Horn of Africa. The United States, too, intervened extensively during this period (and in fact it was the United States, not the Soviet Union, that first intervened in Angola in 1974). From the U.S. side, these African interventions never involved large numbers of American troops. Due to the Vietnam debacle and the lack of U.S. public support for overseas adventures, American officials were simply unwilling to accept the political risks of direct military intervention in Africa. Instead, the United States relied on close cooperation with South Africa, France, and Morocco, that intervened on America’s behalf. The Central Intelligence Agency was used as an additional interventionist instrument. CIA intervention was coordinated to some extent with that of the Chinese. This was especially true in Angola, where both the United States and Chinese (as well as South African) intelligence services supplied weapons to some of the same factions in the Angolan civil war. These various alternate wars extended well into the 1980s, when the Reagan Doctrine increased further the level of U.S. intervention.

One of the effects of this upsurge of Cold War conflict in Africa was to heighten pressure on the remaining white-ruled states of Southern Africa, Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia), and South Africa. The security of these states was greatly reduced by the political changes that occurred during this period, especially the independence of nearby Angola and Mozambique, both of which furnished bases to African guerrilla groups for operations against the white-ruled states. The Soviets and the Chinese provided limited amounts of aid to several of these groups. These military pressures contributed to the eventual collapse of white rule in Zimbabwe in 1980, and also in Namibia and finally South Africa after the end of the Cold War. The conclusion of the Cold War, after 1989, led to a progressive disengagement by both superpowers. Unfortunately, this disengagement also led to a decline in development assistance, which served to intensify the continent’s economic difficulties.

See also Haile Selassie I; Lumumba, Patrice; Touré, Sékou.

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COLONIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES: BELGIAN

COLENSO, JOHN WILLIAM (1814–1883). John William Colenso, born in Saint Austell, England, and educated at Saint John's College, Cambridge, became the first bishop of the Diocese of Natal (1853), where he established the mission station Eukhanyeni (Place of Light) at Bishopstowe outside Pietermaritzburg. His broad Christian universalism and knowledge of contemporary scientific discovery, together with his awareness of African perceptions of contemporary Christian teaching, soon made him a radical critic of conventional missionary practice. This culminated in his The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua Critically Examined (1870), which sought to demonstrate that the Bible was not the literal word of God. The uproar following the book's publication led eventually to Colenso's excommunication.

In 1873 Colenso exposed the injustice with which the authorities in Natal had treated the Hlubi people and their chief, Langalibalele. He did the same for the Zulu people and their king, Cetshwayo kaMpande, when expansionist British policy led to the invasion of the Zulu kingdom in 1879.

Although Colenso's various projects failed in his lifetime, from a twenty-first-century perspective it is possible to see that his biblical criticism was an attempt to place contemporary religious thought on a sounder basis and that his political protest was a courageous exposure of the violence and injustice inherent in imperialism. His daughters, Harriette Emily, Frances Ellen, and Agnes Mary, continued the political struggle for African rights in South Africa.

See also Cetshwayo; Christianity.

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COLONIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES

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BELGIAN

In most important respects Belgian colonial policy was similar to that of other modern colonial powers, notably Britain and France. Despite significant “philosophical” differences between their respective brands of imperialism, Britain, France, and Belgium (unlike Portugal or Italy) were all advanced industrial powers. In other respects, however, Belgium was a unique colonizer. In contrast to Portugal or Holland (from which Belgium separated in 1830), Belgium lacked a tradition of mercantile colonialism. But unlike other states that achieved their modern form in the nineteenth century (for example, Germany and Italy)—and deliberately embarked upon imperial ventures as a way to affirm their newfound international stature—Belgium was, in some ways, a reluctant, almost inadvertent colonizer. It was, in fact, the only one to have inherited a readymade colonial empire in the form of the Congo Free State: Belgium took it over in 1908, twenty-three years after that singular creation of King Léopold II’s (1865–1909) blend of megalomania and rapaciousness had been